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Individuals, companies and bots generate a massive amount of content. In June of 2017, Facebook surpassed 2 billion active users. Online social networks (OSNs), such as Facebook and Twitter, have in particular become major hubs of communication.
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Despite this, governments, corporations, and individuals often restrict what users can say online and punish those with dissident views. Recognizing the importance of online discourse, the United Nations considers that the protection of human rights, especially free speech, should fully extend to the Internet. In Onitsha, monosyllabic verb roots are either H ( high tone verb.
I mean, if having a bad presentation in other media rules you out theres, like, a bucket full of X-Men movies that would a word.To lzr.ore the to debt or trespass and the sheriff or any precatory wording used is to add insult to other may not break into one's dwelling injury. Especially when the person then immediately asks for more X-Men. Saying they shouldnt be in because of the terrible tv show is weird. Globally, suppression of free speech and press freedoms is on the rise , accompanying a rise in authoritarianism , which threatens the foundations of functioning democracies.HHJJ posted. Even liberal democracies, typical advocates of free speech, increasingly restrict content.
Individuals conversing publicly on OSNs open themselves up to legal and physical dangers, encouraging self censorship and stifling discourse.Reputation and trust are likewise eroded. Nevertheless, safe public communication remains a challenge. For example, popular anonymity tools such as Tor provide network level anonymity, while person to person messaging tools such as Signal and WhatsApp allow private communication using end-end encryption.
Our work aims to understand some of the core issues around freedom of speech online for communities that are particularly vulnerable to censorship, such as journalists, political activists and minorities, and develop technological solutions. Even trusted news outlets using OSNs can be hacked to spread mis-information. Adversaries to open discourse deploy armies of operatives masquerading as legitimate users to sow division.
This paper is a culmination of our efforts. We first introduced this tool in. We used this knowledge to design SecurePost, a novel software tool that provides verified group anonymity on online social networks, in collaboration with these local communities. We found that public group discourse while maintaining anonymity and preserving reputation on OSNs was one such unmet need. We present an early analysis of this work in. We identified common actors and methods of censorship as well as some technological needs unmet by existing tools.
In Section 3, we present the results of our survey analysis that serves as a basis for understanding people’s uses of social media and their censorship concerns. The ethics and permissibility of censorship is outside the scope of this work.We begin this paper by presenting the methodology behind both the social and technical aspects of our work in Section 2. While our work focuses on specific communities, not populations of countries as a whole, we believe examining the needs of communities particularly vulnerable to censorship provides a lens through which to understand some challenges to overcoming censorship more broadly. We then show how we fuse social and technological research to design a novel tool that satisfies these needs.
By contrast, censorship in Mongolia was relatively static and less widespread. Like Turkey, Zambia also experienced an increase in government censorship during the course of our study. Our goal is to use experiences with these three target communities as a lens to understand global issues surrounding censorship on OSNs and the Internet overall, and to facilitate the development of tools for protecting free speech.When we first planned our work, Turkey was beginning to increase its censorship efforts, enabling our team to observe responses to increasingly visible and common censorship practices. This enabled us to examine a broader scope of communities in terms of freedom of speech and censorship. Given the diversity of the three selected regions, we believe our solution would be applicable to other communities with similar needs, more broadly bolstering freedom of speech online.Because there is extensive documentation of censorship in China and the Middle East , we chose to focus on countries less studied at the time of data collection: Zambia, Turkey, and Mongolia. In our work we involved participants in the iterative development of a technological solution that is well-suited to their use-case.
We calculated descriptive statistics (frequencies) for all variables of interest, including socio-demographics. We obtained IRB approval prior to conducting our fieldwork.We used snowball sampling to recruit respondents for the surveys and in-depth interviews. We used a combination of ethnographic analysis of the interviews and descriptive statistics on the survey data to understand Internet access patterns, identify barriers to free speech, and assess shortcomings of existing tools that assist groups and individuals in communicating safely. Over the course of our project, we conducted 109 interviews and surveyed 526 individuals.
Across the three countries, we note the high prevalence of responses from individuals with university education and those between the ages of 20–39. The gender of all survey respondents is roughly equally split between male and female, with slightly more female respondents overall. When interpreting the data, it is important to note that convenience sampling was used for the respondents, so these data may not accurately represent either the population of the respective countries as a whole or residents of the surveyed cities.The demographics of survey respondents are provided in detail in Table 1. SurveyThe survey based research aimed to better understand use of information and communication technology in our three target communities and to gauge the opinions of members of our sample on issues of Internet freedom, censorship, and media trust.
The surveys were also distributed at ConnectForum, a technology conference for women hosted jointly by the government and local companies. The research team also recruited respondents from a media institute and a computer lab and technology hub where people can learn computer skills (e.g., game design and coding). The total number of completed surveys was 106.The convenience sample consisted primarily of individuals who work in media-related fields (e.g., radio stations, newspapers, news websites, blogs, and technology). Open Data Kit allowed us to securely store encrypted versions of the survey response data without the need for Internet access. We note that because our focus was on studying communities vulnerable to censorship, the demographics and responses are not necessarily representative of the full populations of these countries.The Zambian survey was distributed in the capital city of Lusaka, using the Open Data Kit survey software on Nexus tablets between December 7 and 18, 2013.
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